Chapter 7

Truth and Self at Colonus
GRACE LEDBETTER

Two questions about Sophocles’s most mysterious surviving play,
Oedipus at Colonus, loom large both in the critical literature and,
one can easily imagine, for readers more generally. The first asks
whether in this play Oedipus, the polluted, banished, suffering em
bodiment of unspeakable horror, ends truly transformed into a di
vine savior and healer. The answer eludes us because, while Oedipus’s
recognized prophetic powers and his apparent apotheosis promise
to imbue Athens with future benefit, the lasting trauma of his life
asserts itself repeatedly throughout the play and, along with his
steely curse that will bring violent death to his own sons, suggests
that perhaps Oedipus has not been entirely transfigured, that he per
haps continues to play his accursed role in the house ofLabdacus. As
Martha Reineke puts it, “Substantive change cannot be tracked from
Oedipus the King to Oedipus at Colonus. Oedipus’ story remains sub
ject to a double telling; the face of the polluting monster and blind
savior are one.”^ 'The second question resonates with an experience

1. Reineke (2014, 129). Reneike (126-29), presents a dear and compelling account of the
scholarly work on both sides of this debate.
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that many have had reading the play: What actually happens in this
long play other than the miracle of Oedipus’s death? Read in one way,
the play consists of digressions and delaying tactics (Will Theseus re
ceive Oedipus into Athens? Will Antigone and Ismene be captured?
Will Creon and Polynices persuade Oedipus to return to Thebes?),
which, although they pose no deeply tragic threats or tensions, enter
tain the audience reasonably well until the “winged thunder of Zeus”
(1460) marks the commencement of the real action.^
In this chapter I address both of these questions with an inter
pretation that at once locates one of the play’s fundamental concerns
and accounts for why the polarity of savior/polluted monster resists
resolution. I argue that the business of this play finds Oedipus de
fining and distinguishing multiple images of reality, or “truths,” in
an effort to meet the challenges to his conception of himself posed
by his traumatic past. Oedipus works to define and ultimately
succeeds in defining himself as a complex and differentiated subject
who withstands difficult tensions, and in doing so reaches a state
of psychic health. All in all, the figure and characteristic activity
of Oedipus while he is in Colonus can be said to articulate a ther
apeutic process that centers on his establishing a complex but or
dered picture of his various images of truth and reality. I argue that
a recent psychoanalytic theory of the self, when used as a heuristic
device, illuminates and helps to resolve some of the play ’s most in
tractable problems of interpretation, as it reveals a unified purpose
connecting nearly every scene. The ideas about psychic health that
I discuss, even though they derive from a contemporary psychoan
alytic theory, engage (in a different way) many of the philosophical
issues that, for example, Plato addresses in his notion of a healthy

2. See, for example, Waldock (1951, 219) on “filler” scenes in the play. Except when noted
otherwise, all translations are firom Lloyd-Jones (1994) and refer to the line numbers of the
Greek text.
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soul that has distinct parts that function together without conflict
and as a harmonious whole.^
In her recent psychoanalytic and philosophical study, Truth
Matters: Theory and Practice in Psychoanalysis, Shlomit Yadlin-Gadot
defends a theory of truth that takes into account both the history of
philosophical notions of truth and the role that ideas of truth play in
psychoanalytic theory and practice."^ Yadlin-Gadot’s theory proposes
that different theories of truth in the history of philosophy (for ex
ample, truth as correspondence, truth as coherence, truth as subjec
tively constructed) each hold a kind of validity that accommodates
different basic psychic needs. Her thesis thus maintains that truth is
multiple and, among other things, “an inherent group of distinct and
definable organizing principles of the psyche.”^ By defining six “truth
axes,” which function as epistemic assumptions, characteristic self
states, and images of reality, Yadlin-Gadot lays the groundwork for
a view of therapy that aims to express and clarify the different selves
and their well-defined boundaries and open up a space for them to
exist together and become more familiar to each other. As YadlinGadot puts it, “The overarching need for truth is expressed across sev
eral dimensions of the subject’s life. Each truth axis creates an image
of reality and a truth within it that ensures the provision of a deep
emotional need which motivated the formation.”® Seen in this way,
the self “gradually evolves from this organization, acquiring progres
sively its unity, continuity and coherence.”^ If the word “axis” gives us
trouble, it may be helpful to think of the truth axes as sets of beliefs

3. See especially Republic 4.443b8-44Se4. For example, “Virtue, then, as it seems, would be a
kind of health and beauty and good condition of the soul, and vice would be a disease, ugli
ness, and weakness” (444dl0-e2).
4. Yadlin-Gadot (2016).
5. Yadlin-Gadot (2016,1).
6. Yadlin-Gadot (2016,125).
7. Yadlin-Gadot (2016,272).
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(held with certainty) regarding a particular dimension of one’s life.
The theory requires us to accept a number of claims about truth: that
it is not one and absolute, that it is “inextricably tied up with the sub
ject and determined by his needs” that it is “a dynamic product of a
long and gradual process of ordering ” that “different notions of truth
do not invalidate each other” and that we have a basic desire for truth
that is resilient even in the face of postmodern critiques.®
Each ofthe six truth axes creates its own image of reality—its own
point of certainty—with regard to a particular psychic need. (1) The
need to manage factual reality and negotiate the mind-independent
reality around us constructs a “factual reality” and finds its philo
sophical correlate in correspondence theories of truth, which YadlinGadot identifies with Russell, Moore, and early Wittgenstein. One’s
image of factual reality characterizes the way one views oneself in the
third person, the way one perceives others as (accurately) perceiving
oneself. (2) The need to lend internal coherence to perceptions of
self and world is met by an image of “coherent truth,” a truth about
both personal identity and perceived externality whose elements are
checked for truth value by inner consistency. Yadlin-Gadot discusses
Spinoza’s and Hegel’s early versions of coherence theory, but could
just as easily have broadened the discussion to include idealist, re
alist, and antirealist versions.’ (3) An image of reality as shared by the
self and select others, along with a point of certainty about that reality,
fulfills oiur need to construct a shared interpersonal truth. This intersubjective self is always set against a singular or plural other, which
can be experienced as either a comfortable “we” or a threatening
them. Anxieties of ahenation and lack of belonging, or conversely,
feelings of being supported by social agreement, motivate this par
ticular need. In the history of philosophy, William James, Husserl,

8. Yadlin-Gadot (2016,64).
9. See Walker (1989).
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Dewey, and Rorty can be said to defend a version of truth as intersubj ective, or reality as a set of intersubj ective practices. (4) What YadlinGadot calls the “subjective-existential” axis of truth finds articulation
in what some scholars have urged us to see as the existential theory
of truth developed by Kierkegaard, Heidegger, Jaspers, and Marcel.
In Kierkegaards version, truth is a subjective moment, a movement
from false to true that articulates an individual, authentic sense of
truth, free from the gaze of the other: “Each subject must find both
personal truth and integrity and an individual way to achieve it.”“ At
the basis of this subjective-existential truth is the need to maintain
loyalty to one’s authenticity and to counteract experiences of shame
and fears of aimihilation. (5) Ihe need to promote goals calls for a
“pragmatic reality,” one in which we can see ourselves as working to
ward a future interest and calculate the ways that reality would ben
efit the self in the future. One place to view this mode of thinking
philosophically is in the theories of both William James and Peirce,
which view the truth as what the future proves to be true. (6) The
final truth axis, the ideal, constructs a reality that contains features we

aspire to and believe in, features that we value as ideals. The Platonic
theory of forms stands as one influential representative of this kind of
theory of truth.^^
According to Yadlin-Gadot, these six truth “axes” (and we can al
ternatively think of them as sets of beliefs regarding a particular di
mension of hfe) must be recognized, defined, and separated by the
subject in order to reach a state of psychic health. The therapeutic
goal beyond that point consists in seeking to achieve a dialogue
among the various axes, amehorate conflict among them, and become

10. See Cannon (1996).
11. Yadlin-Gadot (2016,55).
12. For Yadlin-Gadot s discussion of the history of philosophical notions of truth, see 39-55.
For her basic definitions of the six axes, see 1-13.
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familiar with what are, as it were, the different “languages” spoken by
these different aspects of the self. The subject must aspire to become
equally familiar with all languages of the self An example might help
us to get a better idea of how the different truth axes function in this
theory of the self:
Imagine a familiar situation of a parent and his child returning
from a PTA meeting in which problematic things have been
■ said about the child. The parent s mind is probably racing with
questions: Who, truly, is this child of mine? Who is my child as
he is perceived by his teachers? Who is my child as he perceives
himself to be? Also, who is the “objectively perceived” child
described in the assessment done last year at that top notch in
stitute? Or: What should I do with this child? Do the images
of these different children converge into one figure? And in a
paraphrase: Will the “true” child please step forward? Had the
“true” child stepped forward, regardless of being disappointing
or pleasing to the parent, the latter would have experienced the
relief of clarity and comprehension. The price of this reliefwould
have been the loss of the complexity and multi-dimensionality of
his understanding of the child.'^
In the theory I am considering, there is no single “true” descrip
tion of who the child is, nor are there an unlimited number of true
descriptions of who the child is. The child’s self, and all of our selves,
are composed of six distinct images of reality: how I view myself “fac
tually,” or as viewed by others; my view of myself as sharing a reality
with certain other people; my view of myself as coherent and con
sistent; my view of my “authentic” self (who I really am to me); my
view of myself as working and acting toward particular goals; and
13. Yadlin-Gadot (2016,144).
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my view of myself as aspiring toward certain ideals (which could be
moral ideals, ideals oflove, ideals of career, etc.).
My purpose is not to defend or to raise objections to YadlinGadot s theory; I do not wish here to question, for example, whether
indeed we should be talking about “truth” rather than “belief,” or
whether Yadlin-Gadot s particular six axes are correct or exhaustive.
I wish still less to evaluate her account of theories of truth in the his
tory of philosophy. I wish only to show how her theory, as it stands,
can be used as a heuristic device to shed light on Sophocles’s play, in
particular how it can help to sketch a picture of the dying Oedipus
as a man working ta (re) construct the six images of reaUty as YadlinGadot defines them in an attempt to compose a unified and healthy
self—before he dies.

FACTUAL REALITY
We know that Oedipus has come to Colonus to die, but who ex
actly is Oedipus at this point in his life? His early identity as a wise,
worshipped king who grieves for the suffering of his city has been
shattered by the successive traumas of recognition, pollution, selfinflicted violence, exile, and poverty. At the end of Oedipus the King
Oedipus’s view of himself has crystallized into a single dominating
identity: in his own view he is “utterly lost” (meg' olethrion, 1341);
“most accursed” (kataratotaton, 1345); “the one among mortals
most hated by the gods” (1345-46,1519); “abandoned by the gods”
(atheos, 1360); his lot is “an evil even beyond evil” {presbuteron eti
kakou kakon, 1365); he is the “worst” (kakiston, 1433). Oedipus’s
view of his utter wretchedness, together with what he sees as the sin
gularity of his abject state (he is the “one” most hated by the gods,
the “worst”), signal a rather extreme version of what Yadlin-Gadot’s
theory considers the hallmark of an unhealthy psyche: a “monologic”
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or “epic” state wherein the language of one ofthe truth axes dominates,
“thus creating authoritarian discourse.”!"* In this case, it is the factual
axis, how Oedipus views himself as perceived by others (“most hated
by the gods ), that eclipses all other possible ways of defining himself,
for example, how he might have previously seen himself as aspiring to
certain ideals. Oedipus’s state at the end of Oedipus the King reaches
an extreme of trauma where even the possibility of giving content to
the other truth axes what goals he is working toward, the ideals he
aspires to, the interpersonal world he shares with others, a coherent
view of himself—all appear to have been obliterated.
Near the beginning of Oedipus at Colonus, Oedipus fully
acknowledges a sense of loss of his former self: his fame and fine rep
utation have “flow[ed] away in vain” (258-59). But time has passed
and Oedipus has received an oracle firom Apollo that has guided him
to Colonus, promised an end to his suffering and that he would be
come a blessing to those who accept him as a suppliant, and a curse
to those who have cast him out (91-94). What I would like to suggest
is that, throughout the course of this play, Oedipus goes through
a process of articulating and thereby reconstructing the various
components that make up his self
The axis of factual truth consists not of the way others view
Oedipus but rather of the ways that Oedipus accepts that he is viewed
truly by others in other words, what he takes as factually true about
himself when he views himself objectified as a third person or as
viewed by another. The difficulty with which Oedipus, while he is in
Colonus, accepts the most brutal facts about himself emerges as pal
pably as his intermittent construal of himself as a third person. When
the chorus asks him who he is, he blurts out, “Do not, do not ask
me who I am! Do not question me enquiring further!” (210-11).
The same alarm seizes him suddenly much later in the play when he
14. Yadlin-Gadot (2016,269).
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has momentarily forgotten that he is polluted: “Yet what am I saying?
How could I, who was born to misery, wish you to touch a man in
whom every taint of evil dwells? I cannot wish it, neither can I allow
you to do it! Only those mortals who have experienced these things
can share the misery!” (1132-36). Oedipus accepts that he is viewed
this way by others, and he makes that clear in his third-person formu
lation to the chorus: “Do you know the son of Laius... and the race
of the Labdacids ... the unhappy Oedipus?” (220-22). As we shall
see, however, Oedipus defines precisely what he does and does not
accept about this view of him as a polluted monster. He will accept
as fact that he is polluted, wretched, and repulsive. However, he will
not accept the claim that he is guilty. We will return to this point later.
Alongside his factual view of himself as polluted and wretched,
Oedipus makes it every bit as prominent that his image of factual re
ality includes a facet of equal salience and certainty: that he is a father.
He does not, however, merely assert this fact; he defines it in such
a way that he officially withdraws his fatherhood from his sons and
embraces it as an articulated notion of mutual love and filial piety that
he shares with his daughters. Throughout the play, Oedipus scorns
and rejects his sons for not taking care of their suffering father, while
he praises his daughters for caring dutifully for their father and for
sacrificing much in order to do that (see, for example, 337-56,42160, 599-601, 1348-96). The play brings to the fore Oedipus’s iden
tity as a father, as it deals so frequently with his relationship to his
children and dwells with great poignancy on both his cursing his sons
and the mutual love between himself and his daughters. Oedipus
refers to himself as a father more than once in the third person. Of
Antigone he remarks, “The unhappy one gives second place to her
home comforts, if her father can be cared for” (351 -52; see also 442,
1104-5). Near the end of the play, in a culmination of the contempt
he has expressed for his sons, he officially disowns Polynices: “Be off,
spat upon by me who am no longer your father, villain of villains.
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taking with you these curses which I call down upon you” (138385). The counterpart to this rejection comes near his final moments
with his daughters: “From none did you have love more than firom
this man, without whom you will now spend the remainder of your
lives” (1617-19).
One final component plays a significant role in Oedipus’s notion
of factual reality about himself in the play. Oedipus asserts with
certainty that the gods consider him a future blessing to Athens
and a vengeful curse to his sons and Thebes (287-88, 576-78,
787-90). Oedipus has received this knowledge through Apollo’s
oracle, and ’Theseus honors Oedipus’s claims. Oedipus thus sees
himself as recognized by the gods (and Theseus) as wielding a spe
cial power, as deinos (141), in such a way that will affect mostly
the future, although his mounting confidence and the mystifying
circumstances of his death at the end of the play begin to demon
strate this power.
Although it causes him considerable suffering, Oedipus manages
to tolerate the fact that he is polluted and monstrous. Rather than
deny this fact about himself, he holds it in the balance and offsets it by
asserting, defining, and emphasizing his view ofhimself as a father, as
well as his divinely acknowledged power as both a future blessing for
Athens and a curse for Thebes. Oedipus’s ability to tolerate the less
pleasant facts about himselfbecomes possible as he works in this play
to introduce and articulate the countervailing facts of his redefined
fatherhood and his newfound divine power.

COHERENT REALITY
What Oedipus clearly cannot live with as a fact about himself is
the supposition that he is guilty and to blame for the murder of his
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father and for committing incest with his mother. He denies that he
is guilty, and he defends his position vehemently (974-1002). We
can understand that, for him, several inconsistencies prevent him
from including these ostensible facts in his own notion of what is
true about himself. He cannot be guilty of murdering his father and
at the same time demand filial piety of his children (which he does).
He cannot be guilty of these crimes and at the same time be plau
sibly deemed a blessing for Athens. He cannot coherently claim to
possess the virtues of character he does and at the same time be guilty
of these crimes. Perhaps most significant, he caimot logically make
sense of the fact that he is deemed guilty and at the same time had
no knowledge of what he was doing and no choice because of the
gods’ ordaining and causing his transgressive acts. Oedipus resolves
this tension not by simply denying that he is guilty but by afiirming
more profoundly his lack of agency: “Know that my actions consisted
in suffering rather than in doing” (266-67). His proclaimed state of
suffering allows him to accept the gravity and evil of the deeds; they
have caused and continue to cause him painful suffering, and yet he
removes the source of incoherence that would prevent the fulfillment
ofhis psychic need for a coherent self and a maintainable consistency
of all the truth axes. Oedipus does not explain further the distinction
he relies on between suffering and doing. Does he mean to say that
the gods have determined his actions and that he had no choice in
the matter? Does he mean to say that he acted in ignorance of the fact
that Jocasta was his mother and Laius his father and so he cannot be
said to have chosen to do what he did? From the perspective we are
taking, what matters about Oedipus’s rationale is that he himself feels
a sense of certainty about it; he considers it true that he is exonerated.
That the oracle foretelling his crimes turned out to be both unavoid
ably fulfilled and something that he suffered unwillingly or in igno
rance would not strike a Greek audience as strange.
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INTERPERSONAL REALITY
Sophocles devotes considerable portions of Oedipus at Colonus to
depicting how, in his final days, Oedipus distinguishes the threat
ening “them” from the comforting “we,” and thus establishes an in
terpersonal reality that fulfills his need for intersubjective truth and
allows him to counteract some of his feelings of alienation and lack
of belonging. His image of intersubjective truth consists in his cer
tainty that he shares a sense of truth about facts, ideals, and so on
with a particular group ofpeople, and may not share that sense of truth
with others outside of that group. By the end of the play, a distinction
has been drawn clearly and defended: the people that Oedipus thinks
share his interpersonal reahty and the elements of truth it includes
are his daughters, the chorus, and Theseus. Those he has excluded by
rejecting them for articulated reasons include Creon together with
Oedipus s own sons, Eteocles and Polynices. In the course of the
play, Oedipus has had to earn his alliance with the chorus and with
Theseus, just as he has had to publicly reject his sons and Creon in
order to definitively exclude himself from their judgment. Oedipus’s
need for belonging is frustrated by his alleged guilt, the pollution he
carries, his physical suffering, and his exile from Thebes. The success
and rhetorical force with which he draws the line between those who
share his reality and those who do not constitutes much of the thera
peutic work accomplished in this play.
Oedipus’s close connection to the supremely loyal Antigone and
their shared alienation announces itself firom the very start of the
play as he declares, “We have come as strangers” (12-13) and “This
girl sees for me” (33-34), the latter suggesting a vital dependence.
As soon as Ismene arrives, Oedipus is quick to mark her inclusion
in their alliance: “And it is from these two, who are maidens, that so
far as their nature allows I have sustenance and a safe place to live
and help from my family” (445-47). Notably, Oedipus’s daughters
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are the only ones in the play who touch him physically (329, 1113,
1620-21), a point that is emphasized by the scene I have already
discussed, where Oedipus suddenly realizes that, given his polluted
state, he cannot touch Theseus as he wishes to (1132-38). Both
daughters treat their father with kindness and sympathy (19-21,
508-9) and share both his suffering and the happiness of their mu
tual familial love; “Sad supports of a sad man!” (1109);^^ “For what
was never dear was dear, when I had him in my arms!” (1698-99).^®
Oedipus’s daughters thus share his view that he is worthy of sym
pathy as someone who has suffered greatly and is therefore worthy
of being accepted by Theseus as a suppliant. The sisters share in their
father’s suffering, and Antigone explicitly echoes her father’s denial
of guilt by explaining to the chorus that he acted “unwittingly” (240)
and was controlled by the gods: “For however hard you look, you
will not discern a mortal who, when a god drives him, can escape!”
(252-54). Furthermore, in a striking asymmetry, Antigone chastises
Polynices for his anger (1420), while she does no such thing in the
face of her father’s protracted expression of anger against Polynices
(1348-96), even though she had held out hope that Oedipus would
feel pity for his son (1280-83).
Oedipus’s indignant speeches to Creon and Polynices denounce
these men and, in doing so, specify the ways in which Oedipus does
not share an image of reality with either of them. Creon insinuates
an interpersonal reality that he and Oedipus share based on their fa
milial ties: “It is not one man only who sent me, but all the citizens
who commanded me, because family ties caused me to mourn his
sorrows most in all the city” (737-39); “Is not the reproach bitter
that I have levelled, woe is me, at you and at myself and at all our

15. Translation mine.
16. See also 330-31: Oedipus; “Ah children, sisters!” Ismene: “Ah unhappy state!” Oedipus: “Do
you mean hers and mine?” Ismene; “Yes, and my own, unhappy as I am!”

THE OEDIPUS PLAYS OF SOPHOCLES

family?” (753-54). Here Creon invokes a view of reality wherein he
and Oedipus owe each other loyalty and feel each other s emotions
because they are relatives. Oedipus angrily rejects Creon’s claim that
he shares Oedipus’s sorrow and suffering:
Why do you try once more to catch me in the trap that would
most pain me ifyou caught me? In time past when I was suffering
from my private griefs, and it was my desire to be sent out of the
land, you refused to grant me the favor I desired, but when I had
had enough of my passion, and it was my wish to live at home,
then you pushed me out and drove me into exile, caring not at all
at that time for the kinship you now talk of! (763-771)
While Oedipus takes Creon to be deceiving and manipulating him
by proposing that they share the loyalties that typically exist along
with bonds of kinship, he rejects Polynices by disowning him and
thereby breaking the bonds of kinship: “Be off, spat upon by me who
am no more your father.... I call upon the hateful paternal darkness
of Tartarus to give you a new home” (1383, 1389-90). Polynices
appeals to his father to show sympathy for his son, but Oedipus now
denies that they are father and son.
The chorus and Iheseus come not only to accept Oedipus and
show him kindness but also to consider him part of their collective
reality. Soon after meeting Oedipus, the chorus communicates their
wish that he share in the city’s collective likes and dislikes: “You
are a stranger, poor man, in a strange land; bring yourself to loathe
what the city is accustomed to dislike and to respect what it holds
dear” (184-87). Oedipus quickly agrees to do so. With the news of
who Oedipus is, the chorus at first fears him (233-36), but he and
Antigone win them over (237-91). Antigone succeeds in arousing
their pity (254-55); Oedipus skillfully combines strategies in order
to gain the chorus’s sympathy: he asks them to distinguish between
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his name and his nature; he redefines his transgressive actions as
“suffering” rather than “doing”; he appeals to his “sacred” nature as a
suppliant and their corresponding duties; and he promises to bring
benefit to the citizens of Athens (258-91). He thereby earns their
respect, and eventually their sympathy, which he repays by carrying
out their instructions for performing religious rites according to their
custom and thereby entering into their form of life (461-92). Having
heard that Oedipus has a request to make of him, Iheseus greets him
with empathy: “I have not forgotten that I myself was brought up in
exile, as you were, and that in exile I struggled against such dangers to
my life as no other man has met with; so that I would never turn aside
from helping to rescue any exile such as you, since I know that I am
a man, and that I have no greater share in tomorrow than you have”
(562-68). Oedipus persuades Iheseus to grant his request for pro
tection and a final resting place at Colonus by placing his promise of
divinely ordained future benefit for Athens in the context of the ex
istential meditation at 607-23 that we will examine later and which
suggests that one day Athens’s relationship with 'Thebes will deteri
orate and Athens will stand in need of the divine protection and ad
vantage that Oedipus offers. By the time Creon threatens Oedipus
and his daughters, Oedipus views himself as firmly ensconced in
collective loyalty: “But who could catch me against the will of these
allies?” (815).

SUBJECTIVE-EXISTENTIAL REALITY
As Yadlin-Gadot defines it, the subjective-existential truth axis fulfills
the psychic need for an authentic image of the self—a sense of who
one truly is to oneself (who I really am to me) and provides the experi
ence offamiliarity and intimacy with oneself: “The need for authentic
existence is ensured by means ofthe subject’s link to what he perceives
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as his true self.”'^ This self is prone to particular vulnerabilities—the
experience of shame and the fear of annihilation—and thus aims to
counteract those vulnerabilities. Although Oedipus never speaks di
rectly of an “authentic” self or who he “truly is ” he fully articulates
the sense of existential angst and the fear of annihilation that YadlinGadot identifies as the particular vulnerabilities this truth axis
counteracts:
Dearest son of Aegeus, for the gods alone there is no old age
and no death ever, but all other things are submerged by allpowerful time! The strength of the country perishes, so does
the strength of the body, loyalty dies and disloyalty comes into
being, and the same spirit never remains between friends or be
tween cities, since for some people now and for others in the fu
ture happy relations turn bitter, and again friendship is restored.
And if now all is sunny weather between Thebes and you, time
as it passes brings forth countless nights and days in which they
shall shatter with the spear the present harmonious pledges for a
petty reason. Then shall my dead body, sleeping and buried, cold
as it is, drink their warm blood, if Zeus is still Zeus and his son
Phoebus speaks the truth. (607-23)
Here Oedipus attempts to persuade Theseus that he cannot take any
thing for granted about Athens’s future, and he accomplishes this
through a protracted poetic musing on the threat of meaninglessness,
the inevitabihty of death, and the transience of the goods in life. Later
in the play, Oedipus also frankly acknowledges and accepts the shame
of the incest (Jtautes oneidos/ 984). Because Oedipus thus explicitly
confronts the essential pressures that figure into the formation of
a “subjective-existential” or “authentic” self, it is reasonable to ask
17. Yadlin-Gadot (2016,125).
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whether the play offers any clues about, if not an “authentic” self, then
at least the particular beliefs about himself he holds and articulates in
order to counteract his fear of annihilation and the shame he carries
with him. Oedipus’s confidence that his influence will continue after
his death through his special, divinely appointed allotment as the ob
ject of a hero cult grants him an unusually powerful antidote to mor
tality. We might assume that he deals with his sense of shame with his
belief that he has suffered the incest and the patricide rather than acted
as an agent. And perhaps that is right. But there is another candidate
for Oedipus’s “authentic” self that presents itself in a somewhat sur
prising and prominent manner. I have already discussed the ways in
which Oedipus’s role as a father to his daughters—and his rejecting
the role of father to his sons—figures prominently in his image of fac
tual reality and his presentation of himself in the play. We can say, in
fact, that Oedipus is preoccupied almost from beginning to end with
his own fatherhood and in particular with the exemplary behavior
of his daughters and the love he feels toward them. The behavior of
his sons has, to his mind, withdrawn him from any paternal relation
to them. Two further points suggest that for Oedipus, loving father
hood provides the image of reality that he chooses to count as his
“personal truth” that is not necessarily acknowledged by others. (In
fact, most are likely to view Oedipus’s fatherhood as deeply problem
atic.) According to Yadlin-Gadot’s theory, the subjective-existential
self finds its temporal mode in the present. Fatherhood for Oedipus
characterizes a state in the present (while his role as a “blessing” for
Athens will take place in the future), and furthermore a state that has
(in the case of his daughters) withstood the radical upheavals that
have devastated his life and sense of self Perhaps the most telling por
trayal of Oedipus’s subjective-existential truth axis comes just before
his death, when he embraces his daughters for the last time. In this
moment Oedipus starkly faces the fear of annihilation that he had ar
ticulated so clearly to Theseus earlier. Oedipus must choose his final
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words to his daughters, the one thing he will leave them with, the
most important thing to say. He does not say “I have become a savior
and a blessing for Athens” or “I am not guilty, I have suffered” or “I
once more curse your brothers,” all of which would be in keeping
with the play s discourse. Rather, he zeroes in on what he wants to be
summed up in the face of death:
My children, on this day your father is no more! For everything
is at an end for me, and no longer shall you have the irksome
task of caring for me. It was hard, I know, my daughters; but a
single word dissolves all these hardships. For from none did you
have love more than from this man, without whom you will now
spend the remainder of your lives. (1611-19)
Here Oedipus not only provides soothing words to his daughters; he
also leaves them with a particular image of himself as a loving father.
Of course, his chosen notion of his own fatherhood must overcome
the reality of the incest and its threat to characterize him as a father
who is also a brother. In his own eyes, Oedipus overcomes that threat
by acknowledging rather than denying the shame of the incest (984),
and at the same time maintaining that he did not knowingly commit
incest and is therefore in that regard not an actor, but a sufferer
(266-67). By contrast, he actively chooses his paternal relation to his
daughters. The question of whether we find this reasoning compel
ling is not relevant to the fact that Oedipus has estabhshed for himself
a sense of truth about the matter. His self-characterization at this par
ticular moment at the end of the play—as at every moment—must
be seen as a choice. In this case it is one that exemplifies generosity
and other-directedness rather than self-absorption or defensiveness.
As we shall see, the virtue Oedipus displays here also plays an impor
tant part in his ideal reality, the truth axis that resonates with values
he aspires to.
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PRAGMATIC REALITY
From the moment he arrives at Colonus through the end of the play,
Oedipus’s speech and actions are suflfused with a sense of purpose
shaped by his goal of persuading Theseus to let him remain and die
there so that he can fulfill the oracle’s prediction. Oedipus’s sense of
pragmatic reality, his sense of working toward a future goal, therefore
resonates emphatically throughout the play, and the achievement of
that goal serves as the play’s culmination, although the alleged benefit
that Oedipus will bring to Athens will reveal itself only in the future.
Oedipus projects certainty of purpose and, of course, his belief that
the gods have sanctioned and ordained this purpose: “I shall never
again leave this seat.... It is the token of my destiny” (45-46)j “For he
[Apollo] told me, when he predicted all that evil, that this should be
my respite after long years, when I came to the land that was my final
bourne, where I should find a seat of the dread goddess and a shelter,
I should there reach the goal of my long-suffering life, bringing ad
vantage by my settlement to those who have received me, and ruin to
those who had sent me, who had driven me away” (88-91)j “Lead me
then, daughter, so that we may tread where piety dictates, speaking and
listening to others, and may not be at war with necessity” (188-91);
“But they [Polynices and Eteocles] shall get nothing from me as an
ally, neither shall they ever have benefit from this Cadmean kingship;
that I know, from hearing this girl’s prophesies, and from interpreting
the ancient oracles which Phoebus has at last fulfilled” (450-54).

IDEAL REALITY
Whatever ideals Oedipus may have striven for in the past as the
ruler of Thebes have had to be either abandoned or pursued in a
different context. At Colonus, Oedipus expresses his own ideals in
his interactions with Creon and Theseus, as well as in his portrayal
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of his own piety and connection with the divine. By rebuking Creon
for his dishonesty, manipulation, lack of shame, and lack of respect
for justice (761-808), Oedipus identifies himself as someone who
aspires to the opposing values of honesty, scrupulous speech, discre
tion, and justice. Furthermore, in his confrontations with both Creon
and Polynices, Oedipus claims to see through their duplicity, and in
doing so displays, and lays claim to, a particular kind of discerning
wisdom. Creon’s vices find their nearly exact counterpart in the
virtues Oedipus attributes to Theseus and his people: “I have found
in you [all] alone among mankind piety and fairness and the absence
of lying speech!” (1126-27); “May you be blessed, Theseus, foryour
nobility and for the righteous [endikou] concern that you have shown
for us!” (1042-43). Oedipus explicitly claims that his own behavior
embodies the justice entailed by keeping one’s promises (1489-90,
1508-9), piety and reverence for the gods (“for I come sacred and
reverent” [287]), actions that benefit others (576-78), and the ideal
of familial love that we have already seen him articulate powerfully in
his final words to his daughters.

THE THERAPEUTIC PROCESS
In the case studies Yadlin-Gadot discusses, a neurotic patient char
acteristically suffers from focusing too exclusively on one truth axis
and neglecting the others. For example, a patient might be so intent
on Uving according to certain ideals of love or achievement that he or
she fails to incorporate any robust or certain sense of factual or co
herent truth. In this case, therapy requires introducing the patient to
the practice of exploring the other truth axes and their relationships

18. See Yadlin-Gadot (2016,191-238).
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to each other. What is the therapeutic process that Oedipus goes
through in this play that results in his having articulated and sorted
out the six aspects of his self? I have already mentioned that at the
end of Oedipus the King Oedipus’s view of himself has shrunk into
a single dominating vision of the man most hated by the gods. Of
the intervening years before Oedipus at Colonus, what we know is
that much time has passed, and perhaps that has given Oedipus the
opportunity to reconstruct his view of himself. But in the course of
Oedipus at Colonus there is a process that occurs and is dramatized.
The outward manifestations of this process have been justly described
by many scholars as a gradual gaining of confidence and power, as a
process of Oedipus’s becoming heroic throughout the course of the
play.*^ Bernard Knox charts the crucial shifts from the beginning to
the end of the play: Oedipus begins the play in a self-effacing state
of humility (llO, 144-48)j he has the grounds for a new confidence,
having received that oracle from Apollo; the chorus notices that he
“seems noble but unfortunate” (76). Ismene comes with news of an
other oracle, and now Oedipus understands that it supplements the
oracle he has received and that it is his burial place that will bring
about his future influence. The ritual ceremony he directs to propi
tiate the local goddesses (the Eumenides) restores and ensures his re
lationship with them. When he comes face to face with the accepting
Theseus, who behaves with ideal dignity and generosity, Oedipus’s
confidence grows even more, so that, when he speaks to Theseus
about the future defeat of Thebes, he assumes a formidable sense
of authority. He condemns Creon justly and with vindictive wrath.
According to Knox, Oedipus the hero is now reborn: he repudiates
his sons with a “daimonic, superhiunan wrath,”^“ and with an almost

19. See, for example, Bowra (1944, 309)j Knox (1964, 143-62); Birge (1984, 11); Kowalzig
(2006,82).
20. Knox (1964,159).
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numinous sound in his speech. Theseus recognizes him as a true
prophet, and Oedipus has now become the hero that he will continue
to be beyond his death.^* Others agree that in Oedipus at Colonus we
witness “the actual process ofthe passing of Oedipus from a human to
a heroic state.”“ This general description of the changes we witness in
Oedipus throughout the course of the play seems right to me, as far as
it goes, but these accounts focus on the changes in Oedipus’s behavior.
I would like to suggest that there is more to say about what happens
to. Oedipus internally as part of the process of becoming heroic. In
articulating the six truth axes, as I have shown he does, Oedipus sorts
out, separates, and defines the six separate dimensions of his self. This
narrative he tells about himself is not occasioned by a specific expe
rience; nothing in particular happens in response to which Oedipus
says, “I hereby change my view about myself.” The events in the play
that would seem to encourage his confidence and sense of power—
for example, Apollo’s oracle and Theseus’s acceptance—may very
well be important in encouraging him to formulate the views of him
self that he does. However, what I would like to emphasize is that
Oedipus presents articulate and elaborate rationales for everything
he claims about himself—his view that he is a sufferer and not an
agent, his rejection of Creon and of his sons, his belief that he is suc
cessfully pursuing particular ideals. He is in this way absolved and
defined by his own rational self-insight, by the distinctions he grasps,
and by his ability to rewrite plausibly his view of who he truly is. In
the end, with all six truth axes defined and separated, it would appear
that he stands in a state of psychic balance and health with a full and
nonconflicting disclosure of the different dimensions of his self One
might think that Oedipus’s remaining anger toward his sons poses a

21. See Knox (1964,145-62).
22. Bowra (1944,309).
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conflict, or at least a question about psychic balance. But Oedipus’s
anger is both an appropriate and, we might say, healthy component of
a Greek hero’s character. More important, his anger is not a symptom
of a conflict that has been left unaddressed. If it were, it would count
as an indication of neurosis. But Oedipus suffers from no such neu
rosis. He attains, in fact, a model of psychic health by addressing all of
the truth axes and allowing them to coexist. Oedipus does not sani
tize his view ofhimself or tie everything up neatly. His ability to main
tain a complex image of himself and accept the tension introduced
by his pollution and misfortune attest all the more to his therapeutic
success. He does not deny the facts of his wretched past, but accepts
them and counterbalances them with nodes of certainty that fulfill
his various psychic needs. He does not need to reconcile his image
of himself as a polluted monster and a savior because he can accept
that he is both. The play does not explain why the gods have chosen
to grant Oedipus special divine status and power. It does not need to
because Oedipus simply accepts the fact that the gods have ordained
it and he persuades Theseus of this fact.
The pragmatic axis governs the whole of the play insofar as
Oedipus gradually fulfills the oracle’s prediction that he will come to
a place where he is destined to die in some mysterious way and, after
death, become a blessing to Athens and a curse to her enemies. 'The
dramatic action of the play from beginning to end unfolds a growing
sense that Oedipus will accomplish these goals through scenes where,
at the same time he persuades Theseus and the Athenians to accept
him and definitively aligns himself with Athens (by rejecting Creon’s
and Polynices’s demands that he return to 'Ihebes), he also overcomes
obstacles to psychic health by articulating the various truth axes, and
thereby builds up a stronger, more balanced, and clearly defined con
ception of himself. The strength of the self he articulates is rooted
in the fact that all of his basic psychic needs are met. The action of
the play could thus be said to, among other things, map out a series
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of psychological challenges successfully mastered: the threats of en
during guilt, shame, alienation, purposelessness, fear of annihilation,
and lack of aspiration. The play in this way portrays Oedipus’s in
creasingly heroic nature as not only a matter of realizing his divine
purpose and gaining confidence and power but also, and perhaps
more systematically, reformulating through a process involving both
reason and imagination the image he had of himself that had been so
thoroughly damaged by the traumatic events of his past. The passages
that I have referred to and quoted as evidence of Oedipus’s engage
ment in defining the six truth axes permeate every scene of the play.

CONCLUSION
Oedipus at Colonus ends with a mysterious and powerful event that

the entire play anticipates. But that event, Oedipus’s death, points to
ward an unknovm future that has more to do with Athens and the eti
ology of a hero cult than with Oedipus’s life.“ The play, I have argued,
is concerned every bit as much with the reconstruction and defini
tion of Oedipus’s self through the acknowledgment and definition
of his different truth axes as points of certainty. The play shows us
how a man who has suffered the most devastating traumas achieves
the healthy integration of his different “selves” whereby all basic psy
chic needs are met. Oedipus is not cured by his own suffering or by
his becoming a “sufferer,” but rather by his own intellectual insight
applied to his various images of reality and truth. His past traumatic
experiences, although tragically inflated, can stand for any develop
mental challenge that requires a reorganization of the psyche.

23. On the hero cult of Oedipus see Edmunds (1981); Kearns (1989, S0-S2); Lardinois
(1992,322-27). On Greek hero cults generally see Burkert (1985,203) and Currie (2005,
47-59).
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It should be clear by now that formulating the problem of this
play by asking whether or not Oedipus is transformed into a savior
does not do justice to the complexity of what transpires at Colonus.
Oedipus is indeed a savior—in addition to many other things. The
sorting out of his sense of truth constitutes the primary action of this
play and allows him to transcend the need to simplify his polyvalent
self. A far cry from a play full of diversions and thin plot structures,
Oedipus at Colonus systematically unravels a masterful playing out of
successful self-definition and psychic health in the face of the most
challenging circumstances.^
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